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I.

INTRODUCTION

Workers’ compensation statutes were first enacted in the
1
United States during the early twentieth century.
Minnesota

† J.D. Candidate 2008, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., History, with
Honors and Distinction, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2005.
1. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAW § 2.07 (2006) [hereinafter LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW].
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enacted its first workers’ compensation statute in 1913. These
statutes established a mechanism for compensating victims of work3
related injuries. Such injuries, on occasion, may appear to arise as
4
a result of a coemployee’s actions.
In such cases, an often
problematic issue is the question of when, if ever, in a workers’
compensation system the injured employee should be allowed to
5
recover from the coemployee. The Minnesota Supreme Court
directly confronted this issue in Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football
6
Club, LLC.
In deciding Stringer, the court faced an intersection of
common-law tort liability and Minnesota’s system of workers’
7
compensation. In its decision, the court added a requirement to
the existing test for determining when a coemployee may be liable
8
for another employee’s injuries. The new requirement is that in
order for a coemployee to owe a personal duty to the injured
employee, the coemployee must also have “acted outside the course
9
and scope of employment.” Stringer suggests that the window for
10
coemployee liability will continue to be very narrow.
This note first examines the historical development of
coemployee liability under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation
11
system. It then outlines the facts of Stringer and details the court’s
12
13
decision. Next, it provides an analysis of the Stringer decision.
2. Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified at MINN.
STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2004)).
3. Paul Raymond Gurtler, The Workers’ Compensation Principle: A Historical
Abstract of the Nature of Workers’ Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 285, 285
(1989).
4. See, e.g., Meintsma v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.
2004) (employee sustained injuries from “birthday spankings” given by
coemployees); Ackerman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 435 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (employee killed when struck by coemployee’s vehicle); Kohler v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 416 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (employee
passenger injured in vehicle accident allegedly resulting from coemployee driver’s
negligence).
5. See generally 6 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, §
111.03 (discussing varying jurisdictional approaches to accommodating commonlaw tort liability against coemployees in workers’ compensation systems).
6. 705 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2005).
7. Id. at 748.
8. Id. at 757–58. See also infra Part III.
9. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 758.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
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This note concludes that Stringer’s addition to the test for
coemployee liability is grounded in well-established precedent and
that the addition is important for maintaining the integrity of
14
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
II. HISTORY
A. Origins of Workers’ Compensation Law
The emergence of workers’ compensation law coincided with
15
the rise of industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe. With
mechanization and the pressures for greater and faster production
during the early industrial era came a marked increase in
16
workplace injuries. Employees injured at the workplace typically
17
sought to recover directly from their employers.
Under the system of common-law tort liability, injured
employees could not easily recover for work-related injuries from
18
their employers.
Injured employees had difficulty because
employers were entitled to three potent defenses: contributory
negligence, the fellow servant exception to vicarious liability, and
19
assumption of risk. Armed with these defenses, employers were

14. See infra Parts IV, V.
15. Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286–87.
16. See id.
17. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.03
(explaining the early remedies available to employees who suffered injuries at the
workplace).
18. THE MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, § 2.1 (Jay T.
Hartman & Thomas D. Mottaz eds., 3d ed. 2001). Generally, an injured
employee’s only cause of action was based on the employer’s alleged negligence.
Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286. An employer would typically only be found negligent
if the employee could demonstrate that the employer failed in some manner to
provide reasonably safe equipment or machines in the workplace. Id.
19. 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.03. These
three common-law defenses for employers were known as the “unholy trinity”
defenses. Gurtler, supra note 3, at 287 (citing W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1984)). Under the contributory negligence
defense, an injured employee could not recover from his employer if the
employee was negligent in any manner, regardless of whether the employer was
negligent. Id. at 286. Under the fellow servant defense, an injured employee
could not recover from his employer if the employer could demonstrate that a
fellow employee’s negligence caused the injury at issue. Id. Under the
assumption of risk defense, an injured employee could not recover from his
employer if the employee was free to avoid a potentially dangerous workplace
(regardless of the employee’s knowledge). Id. at 286–87.
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rarely required to compensate employees for work-related
20
injuries.
As the number of work-related injuries increased, the need for
a more equitable system of compensating injured employees
21
became greater. Faced with the imbalance between the rights of
employers and the rights of employees, efforts emerged to
22
strengthen the rights of injured employees. Courts mounted early
reform efforts, but the task of reform was ultimately led by
23
legislation.
In 1884, Germany enacted the first workers’
compensation law, and soon thereafter Great Britain enacted
24
workers’ compensation legislation in 1897.
These early workers’ compensation acts established what
would become the fundamental principles of workers’
25
compensation law.
Workers’ compensation is based on a
26
compromise between employers and employees.
The general
quid pro quo is that employees are guaranteed compensation from
their employers for any work-related injuries regardless of fault,
and in exchange for providing such compensation, employers
cannot be held liable in common-law actions brought by employees
27
concerning work-related injuries. In effect, employees can work
20. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 286–87.
21. MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 2.1.
22. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.04.
23. Id. In general, the courts attempted to limit the scope and effect of the
“unholy trinity” defenses. See id. But these efforts had little impact. Id. Perhaps
the most significant advancement in employee rights forwarded by the courts was
the adoption of the vice-principal rule. Gurtler, supra note 3, at 287. This rule
prevented employers from delegating their common-law duties, such as providing
a reasonably safe workplace, to an injured employee’s coemployee. Id.
24. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 288–92; 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.05–.06. There is perhaps no single reason why Germany
and Great Britain ultimately developed and enacted workers’ compensation
legislation during the last years of the nineteenth century. But in each instance, it
appears that placating an increasingly discontented workforce by expanding
employee rights and the emerging perception that taking greater care for workers
was in fact good business were particularly significant. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at
288–92; 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.05–.06.
25. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 290–91.
26. See 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 1.03
(explaining the basic principles of workers’ compensation systems).
27. Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 183–84 (Minn. 1989);
MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 1.1. However,
employers are not exempt from common-law tort liability to injured employees if
the employer willfully or intentionally injured the employee. See Gunderson v.
Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Minn. 2001) (citing Boek v. Wong Hing, 180
Minn. 470, 472, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930) (recognizing the intentional injury
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without worry that they will not be compensated for work-related
injuries, while employers can operate without worry of being
subject to burdensome personal injury lawsuits for every incidence
of work-related injury. There is thus incentive for employees and
employers alike to support a workers’ compensation system.
B. Workers’ Compensation Law in Minnesota
The model of workers’ compensation law that developed in
Europe was adopted throughout the United States during the early
28
The compromise between employees and
twentieth century.
employers at the heart of European workers’ compensation systems
also formed the foundation of workers’ compensation law in the
29
United States.
This compromise is the fundamental basis of
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) as adopted in
30
1913.
Once enacted, the provisions of the Act became the exclusive
31
remedy for victims of work-related injuries.
But following
implementation of the Act, issues of coemployee liability quickly
32
arose. In such cases, the question was when, if ever, an employee
should be allowed to recover for work-related injuries from a
exception in Minnesota)).
28. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 292–93 (discussing the historical development
of workers’ compensation law in the United States); 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, §§ 2.07–.08 (detailing the emergence of workers’
compensation law in the United States). Among the first states to explore and
then enact workers’ compensation legislation were Connecticut, Illinois, Montana,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Gurtler, supra note 3, at 293. By 1920, virtually
every state had adopted some form of workers’ compensation legislation. 1
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 1, § 2.07.
29. See Gurtler, supra note 3, at 292–93.
30. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified at MINN.
STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2005)); see also Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Minn.
1995) (citing Boryca v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 487 N.W.2d 876, 879 n.3 (Minn.
1992)); Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992).
31. MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 2.1.
32. See, e.g., Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N.W. 461 (1927). In Behr, both
plaintiff and defendant were firemen employed by the city of Albert Lea. Id. at
279, 212 N.W. at 461. En route to a fire, plaintiff, who was riding on a fire truck,
and defendant, who was driving another vehicle to the fire, collided at a street
intersection.
Id.
At issue was whether plaintiff could recover workers’
compensation from the city and personal injury damages from defendant. See id.
at 283, 212 N.W. at 463. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that plaintiff could
elect to receive either workers’ compensation or personal injury damages, but
plaintiff could not receive both. Id. For a discussion of Behr in Stringer, see infra
Part III.
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coemployee under the workers’ compensation system.
In 1975, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of
34
coemployee liability in Dawley v. Thisius. At issue in Dawley was
whether the estate of an employee who was killed during the course
of his employment could bring a negligence action against the
35
general manager of the decedent’s employer. The court noted
that although the Act provided the exclusive remedy for workrelated injuries, injured employees may in certain circumstances
bring a negligence action against a coemployee for the
36
coemployee’s negligence in causing the injuries.
Thus, the narrower question in Dawley was in what specific
circumstances of negligence should an injured employee be
37
allowed to recover against a coemployee. The court held that a
coemployee will not be liable for an employee’s work-related
injuries unless the injuries were the result of the coemployee’s
38
breaching a “personal duty” to the employee.
In order for a
personal duty to exist, the court explained that the coemployee
33. See, e.g., Behr, 170 Minn. at 280–84, 212 N.W. at 461–63. Workers’
compensation law is premised on the notion that the cost of work-related injuries
to employees should be absorbed by employers (e.g., through workers’
compensation insurance) and passed along to consumers in the price of the
product. Arens v. Hanecy, 269 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1978) (citing Eicholz v.
Shaft, 166 Minn. 339, 342, 208 N.W. 18, 19 (1926)). The general concern
associated with allowing coemployee liability is that it essentially shifts the costs of
work-related injuries from the employer and the consumer to the coemployee,
which defeats the purposes of a workers’ compensation system. See Wicken, 527
N.W.2d at 99; Peterson v. C.W. Kludt, 317 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Minn. 1982).
34. 304 Minn. 453, 456, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975). In Dawley, plaintiff’s
husband died from injuries he suffered at his workplace after he fell into a dip
tank filled with a caustic detergent solution. Id. at 453, 231 N.W.2d at 556.
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against the general manager of her
husband’s employer for damages stemming from her husband’s death. Id. at 454,
231 N.W.2d at 556.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant, who had overall
responsibility for the day-to-day operations at her husband’s workplace, failed to
provide a safe work environment. Id. at 454, 231 N.W.2d at 556–57.
35. Id. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
36. Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455, 231 N.W.2d at 557 (citing Behr, 170 Minn. at
278, 212 N.W. at 461).
37. See id. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557.
38. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. The court explained the “personal duty”
requirement: “A co-employee may be held liable when, through personal fault as
opposed to vicarious fault, he breaches a duty owed to plaintiff . . . . He must have
a personal duty towards the injured plaintiff, breach of which has caused plaintiff’s
damage.” Id. Further, the court explained that the breach of the duty must be
based on “personal fault” and cannot arise out of the coemployee’s “general
administrative responsibility for some function of his employment . . . .” Id.
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must have taken direct action toward the employee or have
39
directed others to do so. The court ultimately held in favor of
defendant, explaining that providing a safe workplace is a duty of
40
the employer, not a general manager. Therefore, the defendant
41
never owed a “personal duty” to the plaintiff’s husband.
Following Dawley, the Minnesota Legislature addressed the
42
issue of coemployee liability. In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature
created the Workers’ Compensation Study Commission (WCSC) to
formulate possible changes to the Act that might reduce the
43
increasing costs of workers’ compensation. The WCSC’s findings
and recommendations, based on nearly two years of study, were
44
taken under consideration by the 1979 Minnesota Legislature.
During the 1979 extra session, the legislature adopted a series
45
of amendments to the Act based on the WCSC’s report. The 1979
amendments represented perhaps the most sweeping changes
46
made to the Act since its adoption in 1913. Among the numerous
reforms, the legislature outlined a narrow window in which
47
coemployee liability may exist. Specifically, the legislature added
39. Id. The court explained that “[t]he acts of negligence for which a coemployee may be held liable must be acts constituting direct negligence toward
the plaintiff, tortious acts in which he participated, or which he specifically
directed others to do.” Id. (citing Steele v. Eaton, 285 A.2d 749 (Vt. 1971)).
40. Id. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557. The court further noted that while
providing a safe workplace is an employer’s duty, “the Workmen’s Compensation
Act precludes an action against the employer for its alleged breach of duty.” Id. at
456, 231 N.W.2d at 558. Under the Act, in such circumstances where an unsafe
workplace causes injury to an employee, the employer is obligated to pay workers’
compensation to the injured employee. See MINNESOTA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
DESKBOOK, supra note 18, § 1.1.
41. Dawley, 304 Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 558.
42. See Jay Y. Benanav, Workers’ Compensation Amendments of the 1979 Minnesota
Legislature, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 743 (1980); Note, The Minnesota Workers’
Compensation Study Commission: Its Impact upon the 1979 Amendments, 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1980).
43. Note, supra note 42, at 786. Throughout the early 1970s, the cost of
workers’ compensation for employers, particularly in terms of workers’
compensation insurance, increased significantly. Id. A major reason for the cost
increases was a series of legislative actions that greatly increased workers’
compensation benefits for injured employees. Id. at 787 n.15. Such costs had
increased so much for Minnesota employers in comparison to neighboring states
that these increases became a “business climate” issue during the 1978 elections.
Id. at 786.
44. See id. at 791.
45. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)); see Benanav, supra note 42, at 744.
46. See Benanav, supra note 42, at 744.
47. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Session 1256,
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language that barred coemployee liability unless an employee’s
work-related injuries were the result of a coemployee’s “gross
48
negligence.”
In narrowing the window in which coemployee
liability may exist, the legislature followed the WCSC rationale that
freely allowing coemployee liability for mere simple negligence
would defeat the integrity and purposes of the workers’
49
compensation system.
In 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court again confronted the
50
issue of coemployee liability in Wicken v. Morris. Similar to Dawley,
at issue in Wicken was whether the estates of two employees who
were killed during the course of their employment could bring a
negligence action against the production manager of the
51
decedents’ employer.
In analyzing this issue under Minnesota
workers’ compensation law, the court recognized that its analysis
must take into account the precedent of Dawley and the 1979
52
amendment to the Act.
In deciding Wicken, the court established a two-prong test for
determining when a coemployee may be liable for an employee’s
1272 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)); Benanav, supra note
42, at 764.
48. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31. The added language concerning
coemployee liability read as follows: “A co-employee working for the same
employer is not liable for a personal injury incurred by another employee unless
the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the co-employee or was
intentionally inflicted by the co-employee.” Id. The coemployee liability
amendment enacted by the 1979 Minnesota Legislature remains in effect and has
not been modified. See MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004).
49. Benanav, supra note 42, at 764. In its report to the legislature, the WCSC
explained that allowing an employee injured at his workplace to sue a coemployee
“for negligence and receive a portion of any recovery which is less than the total
workers’ compensation benefits due, and all of the excess, while the employer is
reimbursed from the recovery for any workers’ compensation benefits paid . . .
tends to shift tort liability from employer to fellow employee in a manner never
intended by the workers’ compensation system.” Id. (quoting MINNESOTA
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR, 41 (1979)).
50. 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1995). In Wicken, plaintiffs’ husbands were
killed as a result of an explosion while, as part of their employment, they were
attending a fire intended to dispose of a blasting agent manufactured by their
employer. Id. at 97. Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the production
manager of their husbands’ employer for damages stemming from their husbands’
deaths. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that the production manager breached a personal
duty owed to his coemployees—plaintiffs’ husbands. Id. Plaintiffs specifically
alleged that the production manager, in his haste to complete the fire,
fraudulently obtained a permit to allow the fire. Id.
51. Id. at 98.
52. Id.
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53

work-related injuries.
The first prong, adopted from Dawley, is
that the coemployee must have breached a personal duty to the
54
employee.
The second prong, adopted from the 1979
amendment to the Act, is that the employee’s injuries must have
55
arisen from the coemployee’s gross negligence.
Under this test, the court held in favor of defendant,
explaining that plaintiffs failed to show that defendant breached a
56
personal duty to the decedents. In holding in favor of defendant,
the court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity
57
of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system. Here, the court
was particularly concerned about the consequences of allowing
coemployee liability when the coemployee took no direct action
58
toward the injured employee.
Wicken’s two-prong test was the
existing framework for determining coemployee liability when
Stringer commenced in 2001.
III. THE STRINGER CASE
A. Facts
Korey Stringer, a football player for the Minnesota Vikings,
died of heat stroke on August 1, 2001 during the Vikings’ summer
59
The training camp began on Monday, July 30,
training camp.
60
The weather for the first week of training camp was
2001.

53. Id.
54. Id. As the court explained the first prong of its test for coemployee
liability, “First, the injured employee must establish that the co-employee had a
personal duty toward the employee, the breach of which resulted in the
employee’s injury, and that the activity causing the injury was not part of the coemployee’s general administrative responsibilities.” Id. (citing Dawley v. Thisius,
304 Minn. 453, 455, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975)).
55. Id. The court explained the second prong of its test for determining
coemployee liability by directly quoting the 1979 amendment to the act. Id. See
MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (1992). See also supra note 48.
56. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99.
57. Id.
58. Id. As the court explained, “To hold otherwise, permitting co-employee
liability when harm results however indirectly from the carrying out of
administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities would eviscerate the
fundamental purpose of the workers’ compensation laws.” Id.
59. Stringer v. Minn. Viking Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn.
2005). The 2001 Vikings’ summer training camp was held in Mankato, Minnesota.
Id.
60. Id. at 749.
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61

predicted to be abnormally hot and humid. During the evening
of Sunday, July 29, the night before training camp began, Vikings
players attended a team meeting at which they were warned about
overexertion in high heat and were instructed to stay well hydrated
62
during the upcoming practices.
The first day of camp, July 30, 2001, was a day of high heat and
63
humidity. During the course of the afternoon practice on July 30,
64
Stringer vomited three times. After vomiting for the third time
during practice, Stringer was brought by Vikings head athletic
trainer Charles Barta to an on-field medical trailer to “cool down”
65
and “take it easy.” Already in the trailer were Fred Zamberletti,
coordinator of Vikings medical services, and Paul Osterman, an
66
assistant trainer. Stringer was given fluids and was instructed to
67
rest but was never medically examined.
The second day of camp, July 31, 2001, was another day of
68
high heat and humidity. During the morning of July 31, Stringer
participated in a team practice in which the players wore full pads
69
and helmets.
Shortly after the morning practice, Stringer
dropped to his knees, fell to the ground, and lay on his back with
70
his hands over his head.
Stringer was brought to the on-field medical trailer by

61. See id. at 750.
62. Id. at 748. The Vikings players were cautioned about the heat and proper
hydration by Charles Barta, the Vikings’ head athletic trainer. Id. at 748–49. At
the meeting, the players received only oral instruction and did not receive any
written instructions concerning prevention of heat-related illnesses. Id. at 749.
63. Id. at 749. The heat index on the first day of camp was 109°F. Id.
64. Id. During the morning of July 30, Stringer told Barta that he had an
upset stomach. Id. Aware that Stringer had suffered from heat-related illnesses in
previous training camps, Barta gave Stringer an antacid for his stomach and a
sports drink with an extra electrolyte supplement to guard against dehydration.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. At the time of Stringer’s death, though Osterman was employed by
the Vikings as an assistant trainer, he was not yet officially certified or registered as
an athletic trainer. Id. at n.3. Osterman had, however, completed a four-year
degree program and other necessary requirements for certification and
registration. Id. Osterman was not officially certified as an athletic trainer until
August 31, 2001, and not officially registered until January 12, 2002. Id.
67. Id. at 749.
68. Id. at 750.
69. Id. When the July 31 morning practice began at 8:45 a.m., the heat index
was already approximately 90°F. Id.
70. Id.
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71

Osterman.
Inside the trailer, Osterman gave Stringer fluids as Stringer lay
72
cooling on the trailer floor. A golf cart was summoned to escort
73
Stringer from the on-field trailer to off-field training facilities.
When the golf cart arrived, Stringer became unresponsive as
Osterman and athletic intern D.J. Kearney attempted to raise
74
Stringer from the trailer floor. Zamberletti was called to the on75
In the trailer,
field trailer to assess Stringer’s condition.
Zamberletti, Osterman, and Kearney treated Stringer by
administering fluids, applying ice towels to Stringer’s body, and by
placing a plastic bag over Stringer’s mouth to control his
76
breathing.
Shortly thereafter, Stringer was transported by ambulance to a
77
nearby hospital. Hospital staff attempted various measures to cool
Stringer’s body, but Stringer’s condition continued to worsen as
78
the night progressed. After hours of intensive treatments failed,
Stringer was pronounced dead during the early morning hours of
79
August 1, 2001.
B. Procedural History
Following Korey Stringer’s death, his wife, Kelci Stringer,
80
sought recovery. As trustee and personal representative of Korey
Stringer’s estate, Kelci Stringer filed a wrongful death action in
81
Hennepin County District Court.
The Minnesota Vikings and
multiple individual Vikings employees and physicians, including
Barta, Osterman, and Zamberletti, were named as defendants in
82
the wrongful death suit.
71. Id. Stringer was able to walk to the trailer without assistance. Id.
72. Id. at 751.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 752.
76. Id.
77. Id. Zamberletti accompanied Stringer in the ambulance and assisted the
paramedics in treating Stringer. Id. When Stringer was admitted to the hospital,
his core body temperature was 108.8°F. Id. at 753.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 748.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 748 n.1. The wrongful death action asserted thirteen separate
counts. Id. at 753. Count I asserted that Osterman and Zamberletti each owed a
personal duty to Korey Stringer and that they were each grossly negligent in
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The claims against most of the defendants were dismissed by
83
Osterman and Zamberletti were granted
the district court.
84
summary judgment.
Under the two-prong test for coemployee
liability established in Wicken, the district court held that neither
Osterman nor Zamberletti owed Korey Stringer a personal duty. In
addition, they were not grossly negligent and were thus entitled to
85
judgment as a matter of law.
Kelci Stringer appealed the district court’s grant of summary
86
judgment to Osterman and Zamberletti. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and
87
Zamberletti, but on somewhat different grounds. Under the twoprong test for coemployee liability, the court held that Osterman
and Zamberletti each owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer, but
that they were not grossly negligent and were thus entitled to
88
judgment as a matter of law.
Kelci Stringer appealed the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision that affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and
89
Zamberletti. Specifically, Kelci Stringer petitioned the Minnesota
Supreme Court for review of whether Osterman and Zamberletti
90
Osterman and Zamberletti then
were grossly negligent.
petitioned for cross-review of whether they owed a personal duty to
91
Korey Stringer.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Kelci
Stringer’s request for review and Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s

carrying out their personal duty to Stringer. Id. More specifically, Count I
asserted that Osterman and Zamberletti, as Vikings medical staff and trainers,
each had a personal duty to protect and care for Stringer’s health. Id.
83. Id. at 748 n.1.
84. Id. at 753.
85. Id.
86. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 686 N.W.2d 545, 548–49
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004). On appeal, Kelci Stringer contended that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to Osterman and Zamberletti based on
coemployee immunity under Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at 549.
87. See id. at 553.
88. Id. The court explained that Osterman and Zamberletti owed a personal
duty to Stringer because they “undertook direct acts toward Stringer that were not
pursuant to their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.” Id.
According to the court, although Osterman and Zamberletti owed a personal duty,
they were not grossly negligent because they “nevertheless exercised more than a
scant level of care that did not entirely disregard the particularly adverse
consequences arising from the symptoms of injury Stringer exhibited.” Id.
89. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 753.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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92

93

C. The Stringer Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court framed the central issue in
Stringer as “whether Kelci Stringer can show . . . that Vikings’
employees Paul Osterman and Fred Zamberletti [coemployees of
94
Korey Stringer] are not immune from coemployee liability.” The
court explained that resolution of this issue required answering
95
whether the two-prong Wicken test was satisfied.
In deciding
Stringer, the court acknowledged that it “must address the
interaction between common-law tort liability and the workers’
compensation system, which has restricted coemployee liability in
96
negligence actions.”
The primary question in Stringer was whether Osterman’s and
Zamberletti’s actions were sufficient to create a personal duty
97
under the first prong of the Wicken test.
Under the Dawley
standard that constituted the first prong of the original Wicken test,
Osterman and Zamberletti would owe a personal duty to Stringer if
they took direct action toward him, or if they directed others to do
98
so.
In Stringer, as the court explained, the parties agreed that
Osterman and Zamberletti took direct action toward Stringer, but
the parties disagreed as to whether these direct actions created a
99
personal duty.
In analyzing the questions of coemployee liability at issue in
92. Id.
93. Justice Paul H. Anderson authored the majority opinion in Stringer. Id. at
748. Justice Page, a former Minnesota Vikings player, took no part in the
consideration or decision of the Stringer case. Id. at 763.
94. Id. at 748. The “coemployee immunity” referred to by the court was,
according to the majority in Stringer, established by the 1979 amendment to the
Act. See id. at 754–55; supra Part II.
95. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 754. See also Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98
(Minn. 1995); supra Part II.
96. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 748.
97. Id. at 756.
98. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98.
99. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756. Kelci Stringer argued that Osterman’s and
Zamberletti’s administering of medical aid to Stringer was sufficient to create a
personal duty. See id. at 756–57. Osterman and Zamberletti argued that although
they took direct action toward Stringer, their actions were a necessary part of their
job duties. See id. at 757. According to Osterman and Zamberletti, their
administering medical aid to Vikings players (i.e., other Vikings employees) was a
primary function of their employment and was not sufficient to create a personal
duty. See id.
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Stringer, the court focused on the precedents of Dawley and
100
Wicken. From the outset, the court acknowledged that the facts in
Stringer were not precisely analogous to the fact patterns in Dawley
101
and Wicken.
Both Dawley and Wicken involved defendant
coemployees who held managerial positions that did not
102
necessarily entail direct contact with other employees.
The court recognized that, unlike Dawley and Wicken,
Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s job duties as Vikings athletic trainers
and medical staff required direct contact with Vikings players (i.e.,
103
other Vikings employees). Stringer thus presented a novel issue: if
a coemployee’s job duties require direct contact with other
employees, would carrying out such job duties be sufficient to
create a personal duty under the first prong of the Wicken test? As
the court explained:
Because the facts of Dawley and Wicken involved duties not
directed toward a specific person, we did not discuss
whether “general administrative responsibility” meant
only duties of general impact on all employees or whether
it also includes carrying out work duties, regardless of
whether the work duties involve direct contact with a
coemployee, as the respondents [Osterman and
104
Zamberletti] contend.
The court explained that under Dawley and Wicken, though
direct action by the coemployee is necessary to create a personal
105
This is because, as the
duty, direct contact alone is insufficient.
Stringer court stated, an “employee whose job involves direct contact
with others should not bear inordinate risk for coemployee liability
106
for the simple fact of his chosen employment or assigned duties.”
The court further explained that in Dawley and Wicken its primary
concerns “included that the coemployee not be held personally
100. Id. at 757–58.
101. Id. at 756.
102. Id. See also Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley v. Thisius, 304 Minn. 453,
455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (1975).
103. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756.
104. Id. In Dawley, the court explained that in cases where there was a
question of coemployee liability, “[p]ersonal liability . . . will not be imposed on a
co-employee because of his general administrative responsibility for some function
of his employment without more. He must have a personal duty towards the
injured plaintiff, breach of which has caused plaintiff’s damage.” Dawley, 304
Minn. at 456, 231 N.W.2d at 557.
105. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757.
106. Id.
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liable for decisions he was required and authorized to make as part
of his job and that we ‘[maintain] the integrity of the compromise
between
employers
and
employees’
under
workers’
107
compensation.”
The court noted that it was for these reasons
that Dawley, and later Wicken, stated that “personal liability . . . will
not be imposed on a co-employee because of his general
administrative responsibility for some function of his employment
108
without more.”
Stringer interpreted Dawley’s and Wicken’s discussions of
“general administrative responsibility” as “articulat[ing] essentially
109
the same concept” as course and scope of employment.
The
court explained that “a personal duty necessarily contemplates that
the coemployee must have acted outside of his or her course and
110
scope of employment.” Thus, according to Stringer, there is a twoprong test for establishing a personal duty (the first prong of the
Wicken test): a coemployee (1) must have taken direct action
toward the employee or have directed others to do so; and (2) must
111
have acted outside the course and scope of his employment.
The Stringer court clearly acknowledged that the specific
phrase “course and scope of employment” was not used in either
112
Dawley or Wicken in their discussions of personal duty.
But the
court offered justification for adding the “outside the course and
113
The court’s primary reason
scope of employment” requirement.
for adding the requirement was its deep reservation about allowing
coemployee liability for decisions and actions that a coemployee is
114
required to make as part of his job.
As the court explained,
“[a]cting within the course and scope of employment is what brings
107. Id. at 758 (quoting Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99).
108. Id. at 757 (quoting Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98).
109. Id. at 758.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 757. The court defined “scope of employment” as “the field of
action in which a servant is authorized to act in the master-servant relationship.”
Id. at 758 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (8th ed. 2004)). The court
defined “course of employment” as “[e]vents that occur or circumstances that
exist as a part of one’s employment; esp., the time during which an employee
furthers an employer’s goals through employer-mandated directives.” Id. (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (8th ed. 2004)).
112. Id. at 758.
113. See id. at 758–60.
114. Id. at 758 (citing Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99) (explaining that “permitting
co-employee liability when harm results however indirectly from the carrying out
of administrative obligations incident to work responsibilities would eviscerate the
fundamental purpose of the workers’ compensation laws”).
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the coemployee within the protection of the workers’
115
compensation system.”
The protection to which the court alluded is that under
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act, employers are liable for
any injuries to employees arising out of the course of
116
employment.
Thus, according to Stringer, if an employee’s
injuries arise out of the decisions or actions of a coemployee acting
within the course and scope of his employment, the injured
117
employee’s exclusive remedy should be workers’ compensation.
The court concluded that “adopting a course and scope of
employment prong is compatible with the purposes of the workers’
compensation system” and is necessary for maintaining the system’s
118
integrity.
Having modified the first prong of the Wicken test, the court
then applied its new framework for determining coemployee
119
liability to the Stringer case. The court ultimately determined that
although Osterman and Zamberletti took direct action toward
Stringer, they were acting within their course and scope of
120
employment.
As the court explained, “[w]hile in retrospect we
may want or expect that Osterman and Zamberletti would have
responded to Stringer’s condition differently, they nonetheless
were acting within their scope of employment, and any duty they
had toward Stringer did not exist absent their employment
121
status.”
The court thus held that Osterman and Zamberletti did
not owe a personal duty to Stringer, and therefore the court did
122
Based on this
not reach the question of gross negligence.
holding, the court affirmed summary judgment for Osterman and
115. Id.
116. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subdiv. 1 (2004).
117. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757–58. The dissent’s primary concern was that
there is no precedent or basis for the majority’s adoption of the course and scope
of employment requirement. Id. at 763. But the majority dismissed the dissent’s
argument that Behr rejected a course and scope of employment requirement as an
overly broad and ultimately incorrect interpretation and reading of Behr. Id. at
759. For detailed discussion of the Stringer dissent, see infra Part III.D.
118. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760.
119. See id. at 760–63.
120. Id. at 761–62.
121. Id. at 762. The court further explained that “[h]ere, Osterman’s and
Zamberletti’s obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by
the Vikings and the Vikings’ efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players.
The record shows that the purpose for employing trainers was to protect the
health and safety of the players.” Id. at 762.
122. Id. at 763.
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123

D. The Stringer Dissent
Justice Hanson’s dissent in Stringer stands in stark opposition to
124
In short, the dissent concluded that (1) the
the majority.
evidence presented demonstrated that Osterman and Zamberletti,
as a matter of law, owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer, and (2)
regarding the gross negligence prong, there were genuine issues of
material fact such that summary judgment for Osterman and
125
Zamberletti was inappropriate.
The dissent’s primary concerns
centered on the majority’s addition of the “outside the course and
scope of employment” requirement to the personal duty prong of
126
the Wicken test.
According to the dissent, in order to establish a personal duty,
an injured employee should not have to prove that a coemployee
127
acted outside the course and scope of his employment.
The
dissent pointedly opposed the majority’s interpretation of
Minnesota’s legislative and judicial precedents concerning
coemployee liability and personal duty and presented a distinct
128
alternative analysis.
The dissent began its analysis by outlining the policy
129
At the outset, the dissent
considerations that Stringer raises.
explained that it shared the majority’s concerns that “unlimited
coemployee liability might intrude on the compromise reached in
the workers’ compensation laws between employer and employees,
and could erode the benefit of the immunity from tort liability that
130
is provided to employers.”
The dissent then outlined the
123. Id.
124. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 763 (Hanson, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer
joined the dissent of Justice Hanson. Id.
125. Id. In regard to the question of personal duty, the first prong of the
Wicken test, the dissent explained that, “I would hold that, under our precedent
interpreting Minnesota’s law of ‘personal duty’ and absent directions to the
contrary from the legislature, the plaintiff need not prove that the coemployee was
acting outside the course and scope of his employment, but only that the
coemployee’s acts were taken directly toward the injured employee and were not
general actions taken in the performance of the employer’s nondelegable duty to
provide a safe workplace.” Id.
126. See id. at 763–67.
127. Id. at 763; see supra note 125.
128. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 763–67.
129. Id. at 763–64.
130. Id. at 763.
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arguments in favor of and against narrowing the window of
131
coemployee liability in a workers’ compensation system.
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that because there are competing
policy considerations at issue concerning narrowing the window of
coemployee liability, “any further restrictions on coemployee
132
liability should be addressed by the legislature, not by this court.”
The dissent then analyzed Minnesota’s legislative history
relating to coemployee liability to show that there is no basis for the
majority’s addition of the “outside the course and scope of
133
employment” requirement. The dissent defined the central issue
for consideration as “whether Minnesota’s workers’ compensation
134
laws expressly eliminate or restrict coemployee liability.”
According to the dissent, Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act
has always been understood to provide immunity from tort liability
135
to employers, but not to coemployees.
The dissent noted that
when other states have extended immunity to coemployees, such
136
states have done so expressly through legislative action.
Based on its analysis, the dissent explained that the Minnesota
legislature has never expressed “any intent to abrogate common
137
law coemployee liability.”
Rather, the dissent explained that
Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act preserves coemployee
138
liability. The dissent noted that the Act “preserves the liability of
131. Id. at 763–64. Among the arguments for narrowing the window for
coemployee liability noted by the dissent are that “coemployees could risk serious
personal liability on a daily basis . . . and coemployee liability might provide the
employer with a subrogation claim against the employee, shifting the burden for
compensating workplace injuries from the employer to the employee.” Id. at 763.
Among the arguments against narrowing the window for coemployee liability
noted by the dissent are that “the injured employee is entitled to be fully
compensated for his injuries by all but the employer; the coemployee tortfeasor
should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing; [and] extending
immunity to the coemployee would encourage fellow employees to neglect their
duties.” Id. at 764.
132. Id. at 763.
133. See id. at 764–65.
134. Id. at 764.
135. Id. In discussing immunity provided to employers under the Act, the
dissent quoted Minnesota Statutes section 176.031 (2004), which stated: “The
liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of
any other liability to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse,
parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover
damages on account of such injury or death.” Id.
136. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 764.
137. Id. at 765.
138. Id.
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139

a ‘third party’ to injured employees.”
According to the dissent,
140
“third party” has been held to include coemployees. The dissent
explained that the 1979 amendment to the Act “confirms that a
‘third party’ includes a coemployee and that coemployees are not
141
covered by the employer’s immunity from tort liability.”
The
dissent thus concluded that under the Act there is no coemployee
immunity, the only restriction on coemployee liability is the
heightened gross negligence standard, and there is no mention of
142
personal duty.
Having found no legislative basis for the majority’s addition to
the personal duty prong of the Wicken test, the dissent then
143
analyzed the relevant case law concerning coemployee liability.
The dissent conceded that the concept of personal duty in relation
to coemployee liability originated in previous decisions of the
144
Minnesota Supreme Court and not the Minnesota legislature.
While the dissent agreed that the personal duty prong is applicable,
the dissent explained that a major question concerning personal
145
duty and coemployee liability is the proper scope of this prong.
Based on its analysis of relevant case law, the dissent argued
that the majority’s addition of the “outside the course and scope of
employment” requirement is an unwarranted and overly broad
146
expansion of the personal duty prong.
The dissent did not
dispute the court’s holdings in Dawley or Wicken that established the

139. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5 (2004)).
140. Id. (citing Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 283, 212 N.W. 461, 463 (Minn.
1927)). For general discussion of Behr, see supra note 32.
141. For discussion of the 1979 amendment to the Act, see supra Part II.B. The
dissent explained that the amendment provides a “restriction of third-party
liability for a coemployee.” Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 765. Specifically, the
amendment stated, “A coemployee working for the same employer is not liable for
a personal injury incurred by another employee unless the injury resulted from
the gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by the
coemployee.” Id. (quoting Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex.
Sess. 1256, 1272 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004))). Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 765–67.
144. Id. at 765. See Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98–99 (1995); Dawley v.
Thisius, 304 Minn. 453, 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (1975).
145. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 765.
146. Id. at 765–66. Specifically, the dissent explained, “I read the majority
opinion to expand the personal-duty prong, and quite broadly, when it adds the
requirement that the coemployee’s acts must be outside the course and scope of
employment. Such a requirement is not supported by any legislative action . . .
[and] is not required by prior case law . . . .” Id.
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personal duty requirement for coemployee liability.
But
according to the dissent, Dawley and Wicken set forth a narrow test
148
for establishing personal duty.
But the dissent argued that, by adding the “outside the course
and scope of employment” requirement, the majority broadened
149
the test for establishing personal duty.
According to the dissent,
this broadening of the personal duty prong “would have the effect,
perhaps unintended, of providing immunity to coemployees that is
150
essentially coextensive with that of the employer.”
The dissent
explained that if the legislature had intended to restrict
coemployee liability or extend immunity to coemployees in the
manner contemplated by the majority, the legislature would have
151
expressly done so in amending the Act.
Finding no basis for the majority’s addition to the personal
duty prong of the Wicken test, the dissent explained that, under the
original Wicken test, it would find that Osterman and Zamberletti
152
owed a personal duty to Korey Stringer. Proceeding to the gross
negligence prong, the dissent explained that it found genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Osterman and Zamberletti
153
were grossly negligent.
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that
summary judgment granted for Osterman and Zamberletti should
154
be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Summary of Stringer, Questions Stringer Raises
Stringer modified the Wicken test for determining coemployee
155
liability under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
Specifically, Stringer added a new requirement for determining

147. See id. at 767.
148. Id. The narrow test for personal duty referred to by the dissent is that
“liability must be based on a coemployee’s direct acts toward the injured employee
and not on general actions taken in performance of the employer’s nondelegable
duty to provide a safe workplace.” Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 767–68.
153. Id. at 768.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part III.C.
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156

when a coemployee will owe a personal duty.
Under Stringer, a
coemployee will not owe a personal duty unless he acted outside
157
the course and scope of his employment. Arguably, the effect of
Stringer is that there is now a heightened standard for establishing
158
The standard is
personal duty in coemployee liability cases.
heightened because, for a coemployee to owe a personal duty
under Stringer, he must have taken direct action toward the
plaintiff-employee or have directed others to do so, and he must
159
have acted outside the course and scope of his employment.
The Stringer court’s modification of the framework for
determining coemployee liability naturally raises many questions.
Perhaps most significant is whether the Stringer court’s addition to
the personal duty prong of the Wicken test is appropriate or
justified. Moreover, questions remain as to how the addition of the
course and scope of employment requirement will be interpreted
and applied. Further, there is a question as to what effect the
addition will ultimately have on coemployee liability in Minnesota.
Though subject to criticism, Stringer’s addition of the course and
scope of employment requirement is grounded in well-established
precedent and is justified because it serves to protect the purposes
and benefits of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
B. Basis for Stringer’s Personal Duty Modification
1.

Judicial Basis

Stringer’s modification of the framework for determining
coemployee liability is consistent with relevant Minnesota case law
concerning coemployee liability. Dawley and Wicken established the
160
framework for determining coemployee liability in Minnesota.
Therefore, it is important that any Minnesota court resolving an
issue of coemployee liability formulate its holding within the
precedents of Dawley and Wicken.
In adding the course and scope of employment requirement,
Stringer does not stray from the intent and reasoning of Dawley and
Wicken. Ensuring protection for coemployees from liability for
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 757.
Id. at 758.
See id. at 757–58.
See supra Part II.B.
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work-related injuries was an express concern of both the Dawley and
161
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Dawley
Wicken courts.
and Wicken were concerned that too freely allowing coemployee
liability would defeat the purposes and benefits of Minnesota’s
162
workers’ compensation system. In light of such concerns, Dawley
and Wicken first specifically narrowed the window of coemployee
liability so as to protect the integrity of the workers’ compensation
163
system.
Stringer only refines further the narrow window for coemployee
liability intended by Dawley and Wicken by expanding on their
164
discussions of when a personal duty may exist. Dawley and Wicken
sought to prevent coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job
165
duties.
But Dawley’s and Wicken’s holdings that a personal duty
may not arise out of a coemployee’s administrative responsibilities
did not necessarily protect coemployees whose job duties involve
166
direct contact with other employees.
Stringer extended Dawley
and Wicken by explaining that a coemployee does not owe a
personal duty unless he acted outside the course and scope of his
employment (i.e., a personal duty may not be based on events that
arise out of the course and scope of a coemployee’s
167
employment).
By adding the course and scope of employment
requirement, the Stringer court aimed to protect all coemployees
from potential liability, including those whose job duties require
168
direct contact with other employees.
Like Dawley and Wicken, Stringer narrowed the window of
coemployee liability in order to maintain the integrity of
169
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
Stringer’s rationale
for further narrowing this window is consistent with the rationale
170
Specifically, Stringer reasoned, just
offered by Dawley and Wicken.
161. See Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1995); Dawley v. Thisius,
304 Minn. 453, 455–56, 231 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1975).
162. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d
at 557–58.
163. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d
at 557–58.
164. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 758.
165. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98–99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d
at 557–58.
166. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756.
167. Id. at 757–58.
168. See id. at 758.
169. See id. at 760.
170. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304
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as Dawley and Wicken did, that maintaining a narrow window of
coemployee liability ensures that the fundamental compromise
upon which workers’ compensation is based is preserved and that
the costs of work-related injuries are borne ultimately by consumers
171
and not coemployees.
2.

Legislative Basis

Stringer’s addition of the course and scope of employment
requirement is also consistent with legislative intent concerning
coemployee liability.
The 1979 amendment to Minnesota’s
172
Workers’ Compensation Act was specifically passed with intent to
173
narrow the window in which coemployee liability will exist.
The
legislature added language to the Act stating that coemployee
liability will exist only when a work-related injury “resulted from the
gross negligence of the coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by
174
the coemployee.”
The 1979 amendment indicates that the legislature intended
for coemployee liability to exist only in narrowly defined
175
circumstances. In deciding to narrow the window of coemployee
liability, the legislature sought to protect the purposes and benefits
176
of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
The legislature,
like the Dawley and Wicken courts, was also seeking to maintain the
fundamental compromise upon which workers’ compensation is
based to ensure that the costs of work-related injuries are borne
177
ultimately by consumers and not coemployees.
It was for these
same reasons that Stringer further narrowed the window of
coemployee liability by adding the course and scope of
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557.
171. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 760; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557.
172. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1272
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5 (2004)). See also supra
Part II.B (discussing the act and other developments in Minnesota workers’
compensation law).
173. See supra Part II.B.
174. Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1272
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subdiv. 5(c) (2004)). The 1979 amendment
concerning the gross negligence of a coemployee comprises the second prong of
the Wicken test. Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 98. See also supra Part II.B.
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. Id.
177. See Benanav, supra note 42, at 764; Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304
Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at 557.
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178

employment requirement.

C. Criticism and Defense of Stringer
Stringer introduced language to the Wicken test for determining
179
The Stringer
coemployee liability that was not previously used.
court was acutely cognizant of the fact that it was modifying the
elements for establishing personal duty in coemployee liability
180
cases.
Though Stringer appears grounded in well-established
legislative and judicial precedent, Stringer is not free from criticism.
There is a valid concern that the court is in effect legislating
on its own by arbitrarily adding the course and scope of
employment requirement. Minnesota’s workers’ compensation
181
system was enacted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1913.
Because the workers’ compensation system exists as statutory law,
modifications and amendments to the Act are the purview of the
Minnesota legislature. But interpretation of these statutes falls to
Minnesota’s judiciary.
The question then is whether the Stringer court was within its
bounds in adding the course and scope of employment
requirement. The Stringer court of course does not purport to
modify the statutory framework concerning coemployee liability
established by the legislature. What the Stringer court modified was
its own test for determining coemployee liability within the narrow
window for such liability as intended and outlined by the
legislature.
Such modification was necessary because the fact pattern in
Stringer raised issues relating to coemployee liability that had yet to
182
be fully analyzed under the Wicken test.
In Stringer, the primary
question was whether Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s actions toward
Stringer were sufficient to create a personal duty, even though
these actions were required by Osterman’s and Zamberletti’s job
183
duties.
Upon its analysis of legislative intent and judicial
precedent concerning coemployee liability, the Stringer court
rightly concluded that the window for such liability is to be kept
178. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 759–60.
179. Id. at 758.
180. See id.
181. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2004)).
182. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 756.
183. Id.
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narrow so as to preserve the integrity of the workers’ compensation
184
system. But the Stringer court realized that the original Wicken test
would likely allow a personal duty to exist under the circumstances
presented in Stringer, which in effect would be to more freely allow
185
coemployee liability.
That is, a personal duty could be based
solely upon a coemployee’s job duties that require direct contact
with other employees.
To avoid this result, and to maintain a narrow window of
coemployee liability, the Stringer court modified its own test for
186
personal duty based upon its interpretation of Dawley and Wicken.
The Stringer court interpreted Dawley’s and Wicken’s discussions of
“general administrative responsibility” as “articulat[ing] essentially
187
the same concept” as course and scope of employment. Based on
its interpretation, the court added a new requirement that
essentially heightened the standard for establishing a personal
188
duty.
But as the dissent suggests, a worrisome question concerning
Stringer is whether the majority’s interpretation of Dawley and
189
Wicken is unwarranted and too expansive.
The difference
between Stringer and Dawley and Wicken, is that in Stringer, the
litigation was based on coemployees’ direct actions toward another
employee, while in Dawley and Wicken the litigation was based on
coemployees’ administrative responsibilities over other employees.
Preventing coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job duties
190
was a primary aim of the Dawley and Wicken courts. Thus, Dawley
and Wicken held that personal duty cannot be based on a
191
coemployee’s general administrative responsibilities.
Based on the intent of Dawley and Wicken, it is not an overly
expansive interpretation by the Stringer court to hold that a
personal duty cannot be based on a coemployee’s direct actions
toward another employee that arise out of the coemployee’s job
duties. To hold that a personal duty exists in such circumstances
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
557.
191.
557.

See id. at 758.
See id.
See id. at 757–58.
Id. at 758.
See id. at 757–58.
See id. at 765–66 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at
Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Dawley, 304 Minn. at 455–56, 231 N.W.2d at
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would be to more freely allow coemployee liability, which is directly
contrary to the policy objectives underlying Dawley and Wicken.
Like Dawley and Wicken, the Stringer court sought to prevent
coemployee liability based on a coemployee’s job duties. Thus,
Stringer is much more a logical extension of the policy objectives of
Dawley and Wicken than a broadly off-base interpretation.
D. Policy Considerations Prevail
Though Stringer may be criticized for the basis it provides in
support of adding the course and scope of employment
requirement, the addition is nonetheless justified by the policy
objectives it seeks to protect. In adding the course and scope of
employment requirement, Stringer protects the integrity of
Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system.
Stringer limits
coemployee liability and the resulting shift in costs for work-related
injuries to coemployees. Adding the requirement ensures that
persons whose employment involves direct contact with other
employees will not necessarily bear a greater risk for coemployee
liability simply because of their job duties. As a result, persons
whose job duties require direct contact with other employees will
be able to work without worry that their job duties alone might put
192
them at greater risk for personal liability to other employees.
By maintaining the narrow window of coemployee liability,
Stringer suggests that the circumstances in which coemployee
liability may exist will continue to be very limited. Maintaining the
integrity of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system, as Stringer
does, is important as a matter of public policy because the system
guarantees an equitable and efficient means of compensating
193
victims of work-related injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stringer’s addition of the course and scope of employment
requirement does not in any sense mark a drastic new direction for
192. The Stringer court noted that persons who provide health-care services
would, for example, be particularly well served by its addition of the course and
scope of employment requirement. See Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 762. As the court
explained, “we . . . want those who provide health care services to be able to
perform their duties and respond to emergencies without unduly worrying about
being subject to personal liability for their acts.” Id.
193. See Wicken, 527 N.W.2d at 99; Franke v. Fabcon, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 373, 376
(Minn. 1993); Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992).
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establishing coemployee personal duty. Rather, though Stringer
adds new language to the existing framework for determining
coemployee liability, Stringer is consistent with the intent and
reasoning of well-established precedent that states such liability
should exist only in very limited circumstances.
Because Stringer was decided a little over a year ago, there is
not yet any real indication of how its course and scope of
employment requirement will be treated and applied by Minnesota
courts. The courts hopefully will recognize and accept Stringer
simply as a new caveat in the well-established test for determining
coemployee liability. Stringer’s addition to this test affirms that the
window for coemployee liability under Minnesota’s workers’
compensation system will remain very narrow.
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